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The common law and other legal systems long professed the
assumption that it was necessary to commit physical damage or
injury (a wrong) or to threaten an immediate injury, before the
protection of the courts could be invoked by the person requiring
judicial protection. It was apparently not sufficiently realized
that rights may be impaired and disturbed and injuries suffered
by the mere assertion of claims which throw rights into doubt,
uncertainty, and jeopardy. So the mere unfounded assertion
that a person is married or unmarried, illegitimate, insane; the
mere fact that title to property is challenged; the mere fact that
disputes exist as to the construction of instruments, such as con-
tracts, deeds, leases, will, etc., create situations which endanger
or impair rights and which, in order to prevent even greater dam-
age, require clarification and determination. The private'interests
-the freedom of action or disposition-and the social equilibrium
are both disturbed when rights are thus endangered or impaired
by unfounded claims. Indeed, the courts of equity have long
recognized that an action lies to quiet the title to property if the
title is challenged; and statutes have given a right of action to
conflicting claimants, both of real and personal property. So
ac.tions are allowed to have a void marriage or void instruments
so declared and to construe wills.
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But to secure a judicial construction of contracts, deeds, and
leases, and of other legal relations, it is still necessary-in the ab-
sence of statutes authorizing actions for declaratory judgments-
to purport to break or violate them, in order to bring them before
a court for construction and determination. It is thus necessary
in many instances to act at one's peril in order to find out one's
rights and obtain a judicial decision of a dispute. Not all ques-
tions of civil status or all disputes as to property rights can yet (ex-
cept by way of declaratory judgment) be determined without
prior violence. It is to remedy these defects, so as to enable parties.
to obtain authoritative decisions as to their rights-not before a
controversy has arisen, but before either party has necessarily
acted on his own interpretation of his supposed rights-that the
declaratory judgment exists, and that it has now been adopted,
as an efficient instrument of preventive justice, in the codes of pro-
cedure of many civilized countries, including some 25 American
states. It is also used as a substitute for an executory judgment,
when a plaintiff is satisfied with a judicial declaration of his rights
and prefers to avoid too great a breach of relations with his op-
ponent. By narrowing the issue, with resulting speed of determina-
tion, it prevents much hostile and prolonged litigation.
A declaratory judgment in form differs from an executory
judgment only in the fact that it does not carry as an appendix a
decree of execution. It declares the existence of a legal relation
arising out of a written instrument or other circumstances, and
that is all the relief that the plaintiff desires or needs. It is a
final binding determination of the rights of the parties, hence can
be rendered only where there are adverse parties in litigation and
when all the parties in interest have been cited before the court.
There must be an existing controversy as to their respective rights,
and the court must be convinced that the judgment will serve a
useful purpose in settling the issue. Its grant, therefore, is dis-
cretionary with the court, a discretion which, by long practice, has
in part hardened into rule.
Oonstit1.ttionality. These necessary conditions of a declaratory
judgment sufficiently indicate that it differs radically from an
advisory opinion (which binds no one, not even the court that
renders it, and requires no adverse parties or litigated issues) and
from the moot case (which involves issues that are fictitious, ab-
stract, hypothetical, academic, or dead). Only two courts out of
some twenty-five in the United States have thought the declara-
tory judgment unconstitutional, namely, the Michigan Supreme
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